We find that the generally accepted security criteria are flawed for a whole class of protocols for quantum cryptography. This is so because a standard assumption of the security analysis, namely that the so-called square-root measurement is optimal for eavesdropping purposes, is not true in general. There are rather large parameter regimes in which the optimal measurement extracts substantially more information than the squareroot measurement.
Because of the lack of superior alternatives, the standard analysis of protocols of BB84 type invokes unproven assumptions about optimal cloning machines; see, for example, Refs. [4, 5] and the recent paper by Acín et al. [6] . Likewise, there is a common assumption in the analysis of E91-type protocols, namely that the so-called square-root measurement (SRM [7] ) is optimal for Eve's processing of the ancillas; see the recent paper by Liang et al. [8] , for example. The established equivalence of the BB84 and E91 scenarios [9] , and the fully equivalent security criteria thus found, is strong circumstantial evidence that these assumptions-about Eve's best intercept strategy and her best way of processing the ancillas, respectively-are equivalent as well.
It is the objective of this article to demonstrate that the SRM is not optimal for a whole class of quantum cryptography protocols, the tomographic protocols of Refs. [8, 10] ; it may very well not be optimal for other protocols, too. The equivalence stated above then implies the well-founded conjecture that there are also better intercept strategies than those usually regarded as best. We offer some remarks about the connection of this work with intercept strategies in the Appendix.
II. THE PYRAMID OF ANCILLA STATES
We build on the work of Ref. [8] , where the protocols are phrased as generalizations of the E91 scenario to N letter alphabets ͑N =2,3,...͒. The source controlled by Eve would emit pairs of qubits for N = 2, pairs of qutrits for N =3,..., and pairs of qunits in the general case. After everything is said and done, Eve knows that her ancilla is in the state described by ket ͉E k ͘ if Alice obtains value k for her qunit of the respective pair (with k =0,1, ... ,N −1). Since there is a common (real) angle between every pair of ancilla states,
͑1͒
the N ancilla kets can be regarded as the edges of an N-dimensional pyramid [11] ; see Fig. 1 for an illustration of the case of N = 3. The average ancilla ket
points from the tip of the pyramid to the center of its ͑N −1͒-dimensional base [12] , so that the length of ͉H͘, ͱ͗H͉H͘= ͱ r 0 , is the height of the pyramid. The pyramid volume is given by ͑1/N ! ͒͑Nr 0 ͒ 1/2 ͑Nr 1 ͒ ͑N−1͒/2 ; it is largest for =0, r 0 = r 1 =1/N when the pyramid is a corner of an N-dimensional cube.
Geometry restricts to the range −1 / ͑N −1͒ ഛഛ1, where both limits correspond to degenerate pyramids that have no N-dimensional volume. For = 1, we have a single ancilla state and the pyramid is just a line, a pyramid of unit height and no base; and for =−1/͑N −1͒ we have linearly dependent ancilla kets that span an ͑N −1͒-dimensional subspace, so that the pyramid has no height. In the context of quantum cryptography, however, only non-negative values are relevant, for which r 0 ജ r 1 . In other words, the pyramids of interest are acute, in the sense that the common angle between each pair of their edges is acute.
Alice gets each k value with probability 1 / N, so that
is the statistical operator for Eve's ancillas. The height ket ͉H͘ of Eq. (2) is the eigenket of to the eigenvalue r 0 and all kets orthogonal to ͉H͘ are eigenkets to the ͑N −1͒-fold degenerate eigenvalue r 1 = r 0 − = ͑1−͒ / N.
The N kets ͉E k ͘ − ͉H͘, each of length ͱ 1−r 0 = ͱ͑N−1͒r 1 , point from the center of the ancilla-pyramid base to its corners. They span the ͑N −1͒-dimensional subspace to eigenvalue r 1 .
III. WHICH EDGE OF THE PYRAMID?
A. The pretty good square-root measurement
Eve extracts information out of with the aid of a generalized measurement, a positive-operator-valued measure (POVM), specified by a decomposition of the identity in the N-dimensional ancilla space into M non-negative operators,
The mutual information between Alice and Eve,
is then computable from the joint probabilities
and their marginals
For convenient normalization, the logarithm in Eq. (5) is taken to base N, so that I ഛ 1 with the maximum achieved for uniform perfect correlations, that is, for M = N and p nm
The POVM for the SRM is specified by setting M = N and
with
The resulting joint probabilities are
where ͱ 0 − ͱ 1 = ͱ Nr 1 and 0 + ͑N − 1͒ 1 = 1. ͑11͒
We note that the SRM thus associated with the ancilla pyramid happens to be a standard von Neumann measurement, not a POVM proper, because the projectors in Eq. 
is shown in Fig. 2 for N =2,3,5,10,20,100.
B. Better than pretty good
Whereas the SRM is known to be "pretty good" as a rule [13] , it is also known that it does not always optimize the FIG. 1. Pyramid geometry for N = 3. The ancilla kets ͉E k ͘, of unit length, are the edges of the ancilla pyramid. Its shape is determined by the parameter of Eq. (1), the cosine of the acute angle between any pair of edges. The height ket ͉H͘ of Eq. (2) points from the tip of the pyramid to the center of its base; its length is ͱ r 0 . The kets ͉E k ͘ − ͉H͘, of length ͱ 1−r 0 , point from the center of the pyramid base to its corners. The SRM kets ͉e k ͘ of Eq. (9), of unit length, define the SRM pyramid, which has right angles between its edge kets. The SRM pyramid is wider than, but not as high as, the ancilla pyramid. mutual information. In particular, Shor has pointed out that there are superior POVMs for N = 3 and some Ͻ0, and has conjectured that there is also a Ͼ0 range in which other POVMs could be better [14] . Shor's explicit example for Ͻ0 is interesting in its own right but does not seem to have any bearing on the security analysis of quantumcryptography protocols. By contrast, the Ͼ0 examples reported below are of immediate relevance, as they invalidate, at least partly, established security criteria.
Consider the one-parametric family of POVMs defined by M = N + 1 and P m = ͉ē m ͗͘ē m ͉ with
where 0 ഛ t ഛ 1. The SRM kets of Eq. (9) obtain for t =1. For t Ͻ 1, the measurement pyramid, which has the kets ͉ē 0 ͘ , ... ,͉ē N−1 ͘ for its edges, has the same base area as the SRM pyramid, but is of smaller height and therefore obtuse. Since the angle between any such given ͉ē m ͘ and the ancilla kets ͉E n ͘ with n m increases as t decreases from t = 1, the sector of m Ͻ N will have increased mutual information. But this comes at a price: When Eve finds ͉ē N ͘ ϰ ͉H͘, she has no clue about Alice's value; the sector m = N is inconclusive and provides no contribution at all to the mutual information. Accordingly, the optimal choice of t is such that the increase of mutual information in the m Ͻ N sector is balanced against the increase in the probability of the inconclusive result; this probability equals ͑1−t 2 ͒r 0 .
For t = ͱ r 1 / r 0 , the POVM specified by Eq. (13) is the "measurement for unambiguous discrimination" (MUD [7] ), for which ͗E n ͉ē m ͘ =0 if n m Ͻ N, so that there are perfect correlations, and thus full mutual information, in the m Ͻ N sector. The cost for this perfection is, however, so high that the MUD never maximizes the mutual information, although it can outperform the SRM. The optimal choice for t is always in the range ͱ r 1 / r 0 Ͻ t ഛ 1. This observation is illus- 
͑17͒
This is our central result.
For values that exceed the threshold value of ⌳ substantially, the optimal POVM from the family (13) gives significantly more mutual information than the SRM. This can be seen by plotting the ratio I max / I ͑SRM͒ as a function of ; see Fig. 4 . The → 1 limit,
shows that the optimal POVM provides much more information than the SRM if N is large, and then the range 0 ഛϽ⌳Ӎ 3/N is small in addition.
IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In summary, there are POVMs that outperform the SRM for Ͼ⌳, and we know the optimal POVM of the sort defined by Eq. (13) quite explicitly. We are, in fact, quite sure that it is the global optimum because an extensive numerical search failed to find any better POVM.
A first search covered a large class of POVMs that respect the geometry of the ancilla pyramid: We took parameter t to be complex; we rotated around the symmetry axis specified by ket ͉H͘; and we considered weighted sums of several such POVMs, with different t parameters and different rotations. For all of the many N and values, for which the numerical investigation was performed, the optimal POVM was always of the kind described above.
A second search, not restricted by geometrical or other constraints, confirmed these findings. It used the numerical method of Ref. [15] , which is a fix-point iteration that converges monotonically toward the optimal POVM.
We note further that the large relative difference shown in Fig. 4 occurs where both I max and I ͑SRM͒ are small, and so the absolute difference is rather small (see the figure in Ref. [16] ). Therefore, the SRM threshold values given in Table I of Ref. [8] are quite good approximations for the true threshold values, as shown by the numerical values in Table I .
The "disturbance" values listed in this table are the quantities denoted by D d+1 ind in Ref. [5] and by 1 − ␤ 0 in Ref. [8] , respectively. There is no difference for N = 2, of course, but for all N Ͼ 2 the true threshold is noticeably lower than the SRM threshold. In addition to this shift of the threshold, there is also a reduced efficiency inside the Csiszár-Körner regime (below the threshold) and this must be taken into account when extracting the secure key sequence from the noisy raw data. Fortunately, however, almost all of the practical quantum cryptography scheme presently implemented use qubits ͑N =2͒, and then the SRM is optimal. Also, the optimal POVMs have no bearing on the threshold for classical advantage distillation [6, 10] , because the SRM remains optimal in the relevant limit, even for coherent eavesdropping attacks [17] .
In the spirit of Shor's investigation of obtuse pyramids, the eavesdropping procedure presented here can be viewed as a quantum communication channel, in which Alice transmits nonorthogonal and equally distributed signal states to Eve. The amount of information about the sequence of states sent by Alice, maximized over all possible POVMs, is then the accessible information of this quantum channel. Therefore, the maximal mutual information (17) between Alice and Eve gives us also this accessible information for 0 ഛ, which supplements, for N = 3, Shor's Ͻ0 result.
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APPENDIX: INTERCEPT ATTACKS
Here are a few remarks about the connection with intercept attacks on qunits sent through an authenticated quantum channel. We make use of the notational conventions of Ref.
[8] without explaining them anew, and refer to Eq. (12), say, of Ref. [8] by ([8]-12) .
The geometry of the unnormalized ancilla states ͉Ẽ kl ͑m͒ ͘ is completely determined, for a given m value, by the inner products of Eq. ([8]-6) , and Eq. ([8]-7) states the transformation law between ancilla states to different m values. It follows from this equation that the k index of ͉Ẽ kl ͑m͒ ͘ is analogous to that in ͉m k ͘, and the l index to that in ͉m l ͘. Therefore, it is expedient to regard the ͉Ẽ kl ͑m͒ ͘'s as the kets of two-qunit states that are superpositions of basis kets of the ͉m k m l ͘ kind. They then acquire the strikingly simple explicit form where qunit 1 is sent to Alice, qunit 2 is sent to Bob, and qunits 3 and 4 make up Eve's ancilla. We note that this is the generic form of ͉⌿͘ because all alternatives are obtained from this ͉⌿͘ by unitary transformations on the ancilla. Now, the "asymmetric universal quantum cloning machines" [18] , generalizations of the symmetric ones introduced by Bužek and Hillery [19] , that are employed in Refs. [4, 5] for the analysis of intercept attacks on the qunit in transmission from Alice to Bob, are characterized by a fourqunit state of the form (A4). The resulting states of the cloneanticlone pair are thus fully analogous to the ancilla states ͉Ẽ kl ͑m͒ ͘ in Eq. (A1). Of those, the ones with k l are orthogonal among themselves and orthogonal to those with k = l, and the latter form the pyramid of ancilla states described in Sec. II. Accordingly, Eve can extract more information if she applies the optimal POVM of Sec. III B to the clone-anticlone pair, rather than submitting them to the usual SRM.
